Sunday, February 8, 2009

Blog Four: Kant's "Critique of Judgment"

In his essay, Kant puts together an argument on what beauty is and how it can be accurately judged by an observer. He writes that our thoughts on beauty and what is good are bound to a representation of what the object is in our minds. Looking at an object might give us some kind of pleasure because the object provokes some kind of subjective sensation, but “the satisfaction in the beautiful must depend on the reflection upon an object, leading to [a] concept” (100). He claims that concepts are pre-conceived notions of an object that will hinder the individual’s ability to get away from the “sensible” appearances of objects that they create in their minds and be able to take a disinterested approach to judgment. I took this to mean that a concept is sort of the physical, concrete idea of what something is, but that is only one side of the object/art. In order to really pass true judgment, a person also needs some kind of intuition and mental understanding along with the concept. With this “universal voice,” one can then have the “the possibility of an aesthetical judgment that can…be regarded as valid by everyone” (106).
I was reminded a little of previous philosophers when I read Kant. Plato thought everything physical we saw was a representation of a true Idea, and I was reminded a little of this thought in part of Kant’s arguments. Kant thought that when we looked at an object, it was based upon a representation or concept we had in our mind already. I was also reminded of Hume a little when I read Kant’s comments on the “taste” that is inherent and different for everyone. Hume had stated that “The difference, it is said, is very wide between judgment and sentiment. All sentiment is right; because sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itself…it only marks a certain conformity or relation between the object the organs or faculties of the mind” (80). Kant says in his essay, when talking about sensation that is elicited when looking at an object, that “as regards the pleasant, therefore, the fundamental proposition is valid; everyone has his own tastes” (104). Each of them believe for the most part that there are some inferences that men make about art that are unique to themselves and must always be right because they are their own opinion. However, both believe that there are some kinds of inherent, more valid parts of the man that make him able to provide a true judgment. It seems to me that a lot of the arguments of philosophers’ arguments about art that we’ve read so far center on some of the same general concepts—like the fact that man has some kind of internal sense of what is “beauty” and “taste,” and they also try to categorize art and art analyzation into categories. I appreciate their attempts, but they all seem to run into some road blocks and ask the audience to just accept the things they say as being the way they are. I find parts of each of their arguments to be good points, but at the end of it all, I don’t really think that anyone will ever be able to put their finger on the exact “right” way we can truly judge a piece of art.

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